AN OPTION PRICING APPROACH FOR SUSTAINABILITY-LINKED BONDS

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Sustainability–Linked Bonds (SLBs) have immense potential as a tool for transition finance.

There is, however, rising scepticism among investors over the credibility of SLBs due to their frequent lack of ambition. There is concern that the sustainability targets set by issuers are often insufficient to support a substantial transition.

This paper aims to encourage issuers to set robust sustainability targets when structuring SLBs because ambitious and transparent SLBs can and should deliver an attractive cost-of-capital compared to traditional bonds.

We propose using an “option pricing” approach, in which we apply a technique commonly used in derivatives trading to SLBs, to help investors objectively measure the fair value of coupon step-ups.

This approach has been developed by the Anthropocene Fixed Income Institute with market input over recent months.

The paper describes the methodology for putting this approach into practice.
CONTENTS

BACKGROUND

1 MODEL SPECIFICATION
1.1 Summary
1.2 Model description
1.3 Coupon step-up probabilities
1.4 Priceable KPIs – Model choice
1.5 Priceable KPIs - Parameters calibration
1.6 Non-priceable KPIs
1.7 Multiple KPIs

2 EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS
2.1 SUZANO 3.75% 01/15/31
2.2 REPSM 0.375% 07/06/29

3 END NOTES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
3.1 Integration of default risk
3.2 Effects on duration/YTM
3.3 Parameters calibration
3.4 Advanced coupon step-up structures

APPENDIX 1
Decomposing risk premiums in labelled bonds

APPENDIX 2
Carbon emissions volatility regimes

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
BACKGROUND

SLBs are structured as fixed-coupon bonds where the coupons increase by an amount termed a “coupon step-up”, at some stage during the bond’s life, should sustainability objectives not be met.

These objectives are specified in terms of predefined Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and assessed against predefined Sustainability Performance Targets (SPTs). Coupon step-ups are not new; for example, they have been used as an investor protection measure in hybrid/subordinated bonds, where investors receive a coupon step-up if the issuer is downgraded below investment grade.

Unlike green bonds where the proceeds are used for specified green projects and assets, SLBs set sustainability targets across an issuer’s entire balance sheet.

Since the first SLB was issued in 2019 by energy company Enel, the market has grown rapidly. In 2021 alone, SLBs accounted for USD131.43bn worth of issuances, up from USD8.15bn in 2020. Corporate issuers dominate the market, having seen the opportunity to lower borrowing costs (in the form of “greeniums”) and to signal to the market their strategic sustainability goals.

However, the rapid growth of SLBs has been met with increasing criticism on the structures employed, centred around the setting of (1) sufficiently ambitious KPIs and (2) the appropriate value of the coupon step-up and its time horizon. Both these aspects should affect the pricing of an SLB but in different ways. So far, most studies have tried to evaluate a joint spread premium of factors (1) and (2), which we find to be difficult, even intractable. Here we propose an alternative approach.

A PRICING MODEL THAT REWARDS AMBITION

Not reflecting an SLB’s ambition in pricing has financial consequences for investors.

Until the market’s concerns start to be reflected in pricing in the primary as well as secondary markets, there will be no effective mechanism to hold companies accountable for setting up weak structures. As long as this remains the case, issuers will continue to set KPIs that lack ambition.

Greeniums are the value that an investor ascribes to a bond due to its positive impact potential. Our assessment is that issuers would be more likely to structure ambitious SLBs if they had greater visibility on the potential greeniums that could be achieved. Intuitively, the greenium of an SLB should depend on its level of ambition; as an example, an SLB aiming for a 30% reduction in carbon emissions should trade at a higher greenium than one targeting a 10% decrease. The question is - how to objectively quantify such value?

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3 Source: Bloomberg.
5 SLB issuance totalled USD130.2bn in volume with 271 deals in 2021, see Climate Bonds Initiative, 31 Jan 2022.

www.anthropocenefii.org
This paper explores how to price the pure financial value of the coupon step-up, in order to better understand the all-in spread differential between an SLB and a traditional equivalent bond. If the option value is high, investors should accept a higher price on the bond (and a lower yield/spread), which would explain a spread differential versus the vanilla bond curve.

We argue that the true greenium should be the difference between the SLB bond spread and the vanilla bond curve adjusted for the option value inherent in the SLB.\textsuperscript{6}

**THE OPTIONS PRICING APPROACH**

To more effectively price the coupon step-up, we apply a Black-Scholes option-based pricing method where the dynamics of the underlying KPI can be modelled with a stochastic process.

Using this approach, one would expect to define the coupon step-up probabilities in terms of drift and volatility. It is important to note, however, that in this scenario the volatility does not relate to the underlying security itself (as it would, for example, when pricing a vanilla equity call option), but instead relates to the volatility of the sustainability targets. Hence clarifying the law-of-motion of the sustainability targets is crucial to pricing the option value correctly.

It follows that, for the pricing approach to work, the SLB must have a well understood conditionality. We therefore propose splitting the SLB universe into two categories: step-up priceable (SUP) and step-up non-priceable (SUN). We discuss ways to implement and infer parameters, and the implications.

In the final section, we apply the option pricing approach to two recently issued SLBs and look at how assumptions, the setting of ambition levels, the conditionality and coupon size could have affected their pricing.

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\textsuperscript{6} A brief discussion on premia in new issue bond settings is available in Appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{7} One of few examples is “Spread Analysis of the Sustainability-Linked Bonds Tied to an Issuer’s Greenhouse Gases Emissions Reduction Target”, M. Liberadzki, P. Jaworski, K. Liberadzki, MDPI Energies 2021, 14(23).
1. MODEL SPECIFICATION

1.1 SUMMARY

Designing a pricing model for SLBs should be relatively straightforward, given the coupon step-ups are a vanilla European option.

Parameterizing such a model and deriving a clear measure of value, given the nascent state of the market, is quite the opposite. Nevertheless, by using some well-defined models and frameworks to estimate value, we uncover the parameters that investors are exposed to, improve transparency and enable discussions around the structure and ambition of these important products.

In order to price the value of a stream of contingent coupons, we must calculate the probability of the step-up being activated, if the Sustainability Performance Target (SPT) is missed. It then becomes a simple discounting calculation.

As most SLBs have a single observation point, we consider the KPI at one point in time. (More complex modelling techniques might be required if KPIs are observed over multiple dates). Depending on the KPI, we can estimate the probability in differing ways:

- If it is a continuous variable (e.g., carbon emissions), we can consider models to diffuse the variable forward.
- If it lacks observability, we can directly estimate probabilities through alternative techniques.  

These frameworks encourage investors to directly address the KPIs and consider their ambition, and see that they are exposed to the issuer’s ability to meet the SPT.

1.2 MODEL DESCRIPTION

Consider a sustainability-linked bond that promises to pay coupons \( C_t \) at future times \( 0 < t_1 < \cdots < t_n \) and a principal \( N \) at maturity \( t_n \). If a predefined Sustainability Performance Target (SPT) is not met at a specified date \( t_\tau < t_n \), the SLB will pay additional coupons \( CSU_t \) (Coupon Step-Ups) between time \( t_\tau \) and \( t_n \).

The SPT is organized as a condition on one or several KPIs set against a defined baseline, \( D \). For the purpose of the below model, we will consider that the SPT is linked to only one metric called \( KPI_t \), and that the SPT is met if \( KPI_t < D \) with \( D<1 \). For example, if \( KPI_t \) refers to carbon emissions and the conditionality would be on a 25% emissions reduction by the measurement date \( \tau \), we would set \( D = 0.75 \).

Note that we define the SPT in the negative, i.e. the option is only called when the SPT is not met, in line with market practice. Similarly, the option is of the European “knock-in” style, meaning that if it gets triggered on time \( t_\tau \), it does not reset, even if the company performs in line or better with the SPT after \( t_\tau \). As the SPT is based on an improvement of the KPI between \( t_0 \) and \( t_\tau \), the option is in-the-money (ITM) at the time the SLB is issued.

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8 Djellil Bouzidi and Denis Papaioannou Bayesian networks approach to SLBs is a potential solution for pricing SUN KPIs. See “Sovereign Sustainability-Linked Bonds – Opportunities, Challenges and Pricing Considerations”, SSRN, 10 Sep 2021.
An investor buying an SLB is thus long an ITM European binary call option observed at time \( t_\tau \), of maturity \( t_n \), and strike \( KPi_0 \) paying a stream of coupons between \( t_\tau \) and the bond’s maturity \( t_n \).

Figure 1. Pay-out of an SLB which pays a 25bps coupon step-up if the KPI does not improve by more than 50% at the defined observation date. (European binary call option – Strike = 50%).

Therefore, an investor buying a SLB is effectively buying a “traditional” fixed-rate bond (SLB\(_{10} \)) and a binary option (SLB\(_\delta \)) called if the SPT is not met. Thus, we have:

\[
SLB_\delta = SLB_{10} + SLB_\delta
\]

where

\[
SLB_{10} = \text{PV} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} C_i + N \right)
\]

\[
SLB_\delta = \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{[KPi_{i} \geq D \times KPi_0]} \cdot \text{CSU}_t \right]
\]

We assume that, under the no-arbitrage hypothesis, the value of a SLB\(_\delta \) is equal to the discounted value of the future cash flows it is expected to generate:

\[
SLB_\delta = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{C_i}{B(0,t)} + \frac{N}{B(0,n)} \right)
\]

For the purpose of this paper, we do not specify the dynamics of interest rates and assume they are deterministic. Therefore, we can express the discount factor as \( B(O,t) = e^{-rt} \), with \( r \) being the risk-free interest rate at time \( t \). Note that we assume here that we operate in a market without default risk (we will return to this below).

Assuming CSU\(_t \) and KPI\(_t \) are independent, we can write SLB\(_\delta \) in the following form:

\[
SLB_\delta = \mathbb{E} \left[ 1_{[KPi_{i} \geq D \times KPi_0]} \cdot \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{CSU}_t \right) \right]
\]
The equation simply specifies that the value of the binary option is the expectation that the SPT will be met multiplied by the discounted value of the coupon step-up cash stream if the option triggers. Equation (6) can be reduced to a simpler expression:

\[ \text{SLB}_S = E \left[ 1 \{ \text{KPI}_τ \geq D \times \text{KPI}_0 \} \right] \times \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{\text{CSU}_t}{B(t, T)} \]  

(6)

Breaking down the SLB pricing so far, we see that at the core of the pricing is a measure of the probability that the SPT will trigger, \( \mathbb{E} \left[ 1 \{ \text{KPI}_τ \geq D \times \text{KPI}_0 \} \right] \).

In this context, it is useful to address what is considered a greenium in an SLB. A greenium is commonly understood as the yield/spread differential between a labelled bond and a real or hypothetical non-labelled/vanilla bond. If a green bond trades at a z-spread of 100bp and an interpolated curve for vanilla bonds for the same issuer would suggest it should trade at 102bp, we call this differential a 2bp greenium.\(^{9}\)

This number is generally interpreted as the excess willingness of investors to pay for a labelled bond as it achieves some sort of non-pecuniary motive.

From Equation (1) though we note that in the SLB structure, the differential in spreads should be disassembled in terms of the traditional greenium as well as the option value inherent in the coupon structure. Just comparing the SLB spread with a vanilla bond spread is difficult unless the optionality is accounted for. There are therefore two components in the SLB pricing: first, a purely arbitrage-based condition that the investor is willing to pay in order for the optionality of higher coupons, and second, any additional premium the investor is willing to pay in order to achieve some broader ‘good’ as per SPT.

### 1.3 COUPON STEP-UP PROBABILITIES

Returning to the probability measure that the SLB step-up will be triggered, \( \mathbb{E} \left[ 1 \{ \text{KPI}_τ \geq D \times \text{KPI}_0 \} \right] \), we note that to price the optionality and thus the SLB, a hypothesis must be set on the KPIs’ dynamics, to define a range of outcomes and their likelihood. This is a non-trivial task and we suggest that it should be agreed by the market that some SLBs will be priceable and some will be non-priceable.

An SLB will be priceable when one can determine some kind of meaningful dynamics on the part of its KPIs, which can then be used to estimate probabilities.

An SLB is non-priceable where the KPI is either qualitative or lacks historical data, and is thus more complex to be assessed objectively through a quantitative model.

Such a classification allows investors to make the distinction between weak or robust KPIs and input this information into their investment (sizing) decision.

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\(^{9}\) Note that greenium is defined in the positive on behalf of the labelled bonds, i.e., it reflects how much lower the spread is for the labelled bond versus the vanilla bond. A negative greenium suggests that the green bond would trade at a wider/higher spread than the comparable vanilla bond. Refer to the Appendix 1 for an overview of various premiums in new issue bond pricing.
To illustrate the construction of probabilistic measures, let us now turn to the application of this structure to an area which is ubiquitous in SLBs, carbon emissions. A standard construct is to relate the issuer’s emissions to some threshold reduction level at time $t$. If the emissions reduction is not met, the coupon steps up. We consider this to be a \textit{priceable} KPI.

1.4 PRICEABLE KPIs – MODEL CHOICE

To derive likelihood that the SPT will trigger and thus price the structure appropriately, we suggest the following framework on how the KPI will evolve:

1. The issuer’s own current emissions (‘relative position’, marked as blue dots in Figures 2-4).
2. The issuer’s sector emissions and emissions trend (‘exogenous trend’, $CE^{SECT}$) that are exogenously given, for example by standards such as the Science Based Targets Initiative (SBTI).
3. The issuer’s own emissions trend (‘deterministic trend’, $CE^{*}$, see Figure 4). A special case is where we make no assumptions on this, i.e., that trend growth is zero, $CE^{0}$, as in Figure 2 and 3.
4. The distributional properties of the KPI as depicted by the titled probability density functions (blue, yellow) in the figures. We assume that these are normal distributions with varying volatility.

In terms of a Black-Scholes option pricing framework, (2) + (3) will give us the drift factor used in calculating the forward value of the KPI.

Let us first look at a scenario, illustrated in Figure 2, where we assume that there is no deterministic carbon reduction trend for the company. Left un-incentivized, the company’s carbon emissions would follow a completely stochastic process with zero emissions reduction expectation. Emissions could increase or decrease. In that case, it is heads or tails if you get access to the stepped-up coupons. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, there will be some probability distribution (blue) around that zero deterministic trend $CE^{0}$.

Figure 2. Evolution of SLB KPI over time: No carbon emission increase, no endogenous trend.
Figure 3. Zero ambition, sector carbon decrease trend: how higher volatility (blue probability density function) makes the probability of reaching the target higher, and therefore the option value to a holder of the SLB lower.

Turn instead to a second scenario, Figure 3 where the investor posits that carbon emissions need to shrink by 5% (CE\textsuperscript{SECT}) per annum in order to align with exogenous expectations, but there is no internal reduction trend within the company. The company’s emissions remain completely stochastic. In this case, it makes sense that more volatility (the blue probability distribution in the figure) provides a higher probability that the step-up will not materialize\textsuperscript{10}, or conversely a lower probability for a step-up. Thus, the premium for the step-up option shall be lower when volatility is higher.

Finally, we look at a third scenario, Figure 4, where the ambition is linked to a sector decrease in carbon emissions (say 5% per annum). However, the company may end up having an even more ambitious reduction trajectory (CE\textsuperscript{*}) if it decides to pursue that. If the investor agrees to strike the sustainability condition at the sector trend, the company can “arbitrage” the premium they have been paid (corresponding to a+b). If they achieve the trajectory (CE\textsuperscript{*}), the premium b that they have received has been an overcompensation on behalf of investors.

This is an interesting conclusion - if investors are driven by scientific targets where it is clear what the company should achieve on average in order to be sustainability-aligned, but the issuer is more ambitious than that (recognizing that there will be cost associated with that ambition), then there is an excess optionality premium that accrues to the benefit of the issuer.

\textsuperscript{10} The probability that the coupon will not step up is the part of the probability distribution south of the CE\textsuperscript{SECT} line. It follows that the probability that coupon will step up is everything north of the line. In Figure 3, the blue distribution (with higher volatility) has a bigger mass south of the line than the yellow distribution (lower volatility). Hence, the higher volatility distribution provides a lower probability for a step up and consequently less value in terms of optionality.
Two key factors come out of the application of the model:

1. Setting the baseline trend (the exogenous trend) - A more aggressive peer trend (steeper sectoral CO2 emissions reduction pathways) decreases the probability that the SPT will not be triggered/the option will knock-in, and thus reduces the arbitrage value of the SLB. An additional outcome of the model is that the SLB price does not depend on the baseline, only on the level of CO2 emissions at the time the SLB is being issued. Thus, there are no “rational” reasons for issuers setting baselines far in the past other than for marketing purposes.

2. Deciding on the discretionary capacity of the company to affect activities such that the company’s emissions converge towards the trend - This is the “volatility” in the model. We can also interpret this number as a measure of the investor’s belief that the company has means to actually stay below the SPT. This is an important point; a high belief that the company could reach the target (= a high volatility factor) implies, ceteris paribus, a lower value for the investor of the potential coupon step-ups. The investor simply does not expect the step-ups to be paid out.

To formalize the above, the KPI is defined as the company’s carbon emissions $CE_t$ at time $\tau$, and $CE_0$ is the emission at the time zero, i.e. at issuance of the bond.\(^{11}\) Thus,

$$SLB^0 = \mathbb{E} \left[ 1_{[CE_0,0-CE_t]} \right] \cdot \sum_{t=\tau}^{\infty} \frac{CSU_t}{B(0,t)} \tag{7}$$

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\(^{11}\) We will return to more specific metrics around carbon emissions below.
Let us now more specifically define the dynamics of the hypothetical process driving whether the sustainability condition will be met or not, i.e., how do we specify \( CE_t \) in order to evaluate \( \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}_{\{CE_t \geq CE_0\}}] \)? We let carbon emissions be described by a geometric Brownian motion, satisfying the following differential equation:

\[
\frac{dCE_t}{CE_t} = \delta \, dt + \sigma \, dW_t
\]

where \( \delta \) (the “drift”) is the general trend that the company needs to catch up to in terms of its sustainability target. This parameter essentially guides on what the company needs to outperform on, in order to not have to pay out stepped up coupons. We discuss more specific measures below.

The parameter \( \sigma \) provides the volatility metric of this stochastic process. In our framework, we see this reflecting two dimensions: firstly, the magnitude of the stochastics affecting the company in terms of normal random events (e.g., changes in demand, production techniques based on raw materials, etc); and secondly, the capacity for the company to influence the evolution of the sustainability factor themselves. We can also interpret this number as a measure of the investor’s confidence that the company has means to meet the SPT. This is an important point worth repeating: high confidence that the company could reach the target (= a high volatility factor) implies, ceteris paribus, lower probability for the investor that the coupon step-up will be paid out.

**Example:** consider a thermal coal issuer issuing an SLB with a condition to cut thermal coal production by 50% in five years. The investor thinks it unlikely that the issuer will meet the condition as it would mean a fundamental change of the current business model, and thus a high probability that they will receive the coupon step up. This optionality is thus more valuable to the investor than if the issuer was more likely to reach the KPI. Taking this to the next step, the thermal coal issuer could thus extract a higher premium/lower cost-of-capital for setting an ambitious target than if they were less ambitious. Note the potential for different views on the volatility/probability factor if you are an investor or issuer.

Using the closed form of the Black-Scholes formula for binary options pricing\(^{12}\) and the law of motion in (7), the price of the SC coupon stream \( SLB_0 \) can then be expressed as:

\[
SLB_0^\delta = \phi(d_2) \cdot \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} CSU_t \cdot B(0,t)
\]

with:

- \( \phi \) the cumulative distribution function,
- \( d_2 = d_1 \cdot \sigma \sqrt{t} + \text{D} \)
- \( d_1 = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{CSU_1}{B(0,t)}\right) + (\delta + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})t}{\sigma \sqrt{t}} \)
- \( \text{D} \) being the option’s strike price.

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\(^{12}\) “Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives” - John C. Hull.
AN OPTION PRICING APPROACH FOR SUSTAINABILITY-LINKED BONDS

In the language of option pricing, the investor is buying a (binary) European call option where the process governing the payout is not based on the underlying asset price itself, but another stochastic process. The SLB’s issuer, from this perspective, is selling the call option and collecting the premium. Combining current emissions, drift parameters and volatility, as well as call dates, defines how far in- or out-of-the-money the option is on issuance date, with commensurate effect on the price of the option/SLB.

Under the hypothesis that there is no arbitrage in the bond markets and that investors are not assigning non-pecuniary effects of their investments, the price of a SLB should be equal to the price of a “traditional” bond issued on the same day and with the same maturity, paying fixed coupons \( C_t \) between \( t_1 \) and \( t_n \).

Thus, we can write:

\[
\text{SLB}_n = \left( \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{C_t}{B(0,t)} + \frac{N}{B(0,n)} \right) + \varphi(d_2) \times \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{CSU_t}{B(0,t)} = \left( \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{C_t}{B(0,t)} + \frac{N}{B(0,n)} \right)
\]

This equation tells us that in the absence of non-financial considerations from investors (i.e., pure value-based greenium and new issue premium – see Appendix 1), the spread between \( C_t \) and \( C_t' \) should be a function of the SLB’s embedded option price adjusted for discount factors:

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{C_t - C_t'}{B(0,t)} = \varphi(d_2) \times \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{CSU_t}{B(0,t)}
\]

It should be noted that all else equal, the relationship between the coupon step-up and the option price is linear according to the above equation.

1.5 PRICEABLE KPIs - PARAMETERS CALIBRATION

As discussed in the previous section, the price of the option embedded in the SLB, depends on the calibration of two parameters: the drift and the volatility of the KPI. The direct way to calibrate the option parameters would be to look at the historical data of the KPIs and from that data make an inference on the dynamics of the KPI.

Put more simply, in order to forecast how likely it is that the KPI will achieve the SLB condition, we need to have some idea about the dynamics of the KPI such that we can generate a forecasting model.

This requires the KPI to be (1) measurable and (2) have actual time-series data for those measurements. This is expressed in ICMA’s “Sustainability-Linked Bond Principles - Voluntary Process Guidelines” (June, 2020): “The KPIs should be measurable or quantifiable on a consistent methodological basis.”

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13 We also note the added condition with respect to benchmarks: “[...] able to be benchmarked, i.e., as much as possible using an external reference or definitions to facilitate the assessment of the SPT’s level of ambition,” which is relevant in the context of our earlier discussion around ambition levels.
For the purpose of our methodology, an SLB with KPIs that fulfill conditions (1) and (2) above is defined as **step-up priceable (SUP)**, simply meaning that we can infer some sort of probability distribution for the likelihood of a coupon step-up. SLBs where no or little such inference that can be made, we define as **step-up non-priceable (SUN)**.

This is not to make a distinction of the quality of either category’s non-financial impact: a SUN-SLB may have much greater non-financial impact than a SUP-SLB and thus deserve a greater premium. What we are highlighting is a SUN-SLB has to be priced differently than the SUP-SLB. The advantage of the SUP is that, under our methodology, this can be partially priced, which should lead to a lower uncertainty premium, ceteris paribus, in the SUP-SLB versus the SUN-SLB.

Under the assumption that we are working with a SUP-SLB, and assuming a law-of-motion as of Equation (7), we now turn to discussing how to calibrate the drift and volatility parameters.

**Drift - \( \delta \)**

The drift is a model parameter which determines the carbon forward or expected level of the KPI at observation date. It can be calibrated to macro targets, but care should be taken that it represents a realistic base case scenario, and not an ambitious target in itself. For example, in the context of carbon emissions, a macro target such as the reduction in absolute emissions needed per annum to align with the Paris Agreement could be used to calibrate a high-level drift, with adjustments made for current expectations in the relevant sector. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), limiting global warming to below 2°C requires a decline of 25% from 2010 levels by 2030 (-2.84% p.a.) whereas the 1.5°C scenario entails a decline of 45% (-5.80% p.a.).

Other, more specific ways to calibrate the drift rely on issuance-level analysis based, for example, on the below parameters:

- Historical data
- Science-based targets
- Peer-based comparison
- Issuer’s declared sustainability targets
- Climate scenarios
- Regulatory requirements

This clearly highlights the need for further research into relevant drift terms, but the advantage of specifying into a single drift term is that it becomes in some form comparable across SLBs such that investors can have a first go at ambition levels built into the comparables.

There are clearly many ways to think about calibrating a drift factor using data. It can also, perhaps more intuitively, be thought of as defining the forward level of carbon, i.e., the expected level in the absence of any change in strategy. An SPT struck exactly at the drift level is the equivalent of an At The Money (ATM) option, and so should have exactly 50% probability of being reached, and very little exposure to volatility.

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14 "Special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways", IPCC, 2018.
This thinking exposes a potential risk of using a drift which is too aggressive. We know targets should be to limit warming to 1.5°C but the expectation is that current plans will fall short. Setting a KPI target at such a reduction, would give a 50% probability of success, when the true success rate unfortunately may be commensurately lower. From a modelling perspective, this would undervalue the option for the investor, and so reduce the funding benefit to the issuer if in fact such a goal were achieved.

In a future state where the SLB market develops, KPIs are rigorous and measurable, and pricing is transparent, we could imply drift from pricing of SLBs. We could theoretically observe expected drifts for different sectors, and issuer-specific drifts based on credibility of individual transition plans. Counter-intuitively, a very strong transition plan, would make one's drift more negative, and so require even more ambitious outperformance on KPIs in order to achieve the funding reduction available via an SLB structure. One would hope a credible transition plan would give an attractive fund rate via a traditional instrument.

Volatility - \(\sigma\)

In order to account for the capacity of the issuer to influence its carbon emissions, we can express the volatility as follows:

\[
\sigma = \sigma_i \cdot \beta
\]

where:

- \(\sigma_i\) is the carbon emissions’ intrinsic volatility calculated based on the issuer’s historical data (i.e., historical volatility)
- \(\beta\) is a measure of magnitude of the issuer’s capacity to influence its carbon emissions.

We recognize the complexity to calibrate the \(\beta\) parameter as it depends on the investors’ appreciation of the issuer’s sustainability profile. Where no strong such views exist, one can/should simply set \(\beta = 1\).

If one decides to apply \(\beta\) adjustments, an issuer perceived as unlikely to improve its carbon emissions profile (for example, an issuer without a credible transition plan or management team) would get a \(\beta < 1\), whereas an issuer whose management is fully committed to transition to a low carbon production process would get a \(\beta > 1\). In terms of our earlier discussion around a divergence between investors’ perception of probabilities to reach targets versus the issuer’s belief, this would manifest through varying values of \(\beta\). If we assume that investors have a belief \(\beta\) and the issuer has its own \(\beta^*\) such that \(\beta < \beta^*\), then by necessity investors’ volatility assumption will be lower than the issuer’s, \(\sigma < \sigma^*\), implying that the issuer can harvest an excess SLB premium.\(^{15}\)

### 1.6 Non-Priceable KPIs

We have observed a very broad range of KPIs on which SLBs can be written. Above we have presented a robust pricing framework where a KPI can be modelled using a distribution, but there are many other examples where that cannot be used. We have seen KPIs based on improving external ratings or scores, and while the score itself may be a continuous variable, there is insufficient data to try and model it.

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\(^{15}\) We discuss this concept further in Appendix 2.
We have seen KPIs that depend on a binary event, such as introducing certain internal governance improvements.

Despite it being hard to use historical data to model a probability, we can debate a judgement-derived probability, in order to translate the SLB pricing into more explicit views on the achievability of a given SPT.

### 1.7 Multiple KPIs

So far, we have focused on SLBs with carbon emissions as the only KPI but many SLBs depend on more than one. Canadian energy company Enbridge issued in 2021 an SLB linked to carbon emissions, workforce diversity and percentage of women on the board.\(^\text{16}\) Although integrating multiple KPIs can be perceived by the market as the issuer’s commitment to its sustainability strategy across the company, we want to bring our readers’ attention to the resulting increased pricing complexity, where the distinction between SUP and SUN-SLBs is also important.

If we consider an SLB dependent on two KPIs, Equation (3) becomes:

\[
SLB_2 = E \left[ \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} 1_{\{KPI_1 \leq D \}} \cdot 1_{\{KPI_2 \leq \text{Step-Up} \}} \times CSU_t \right] \quad (11)
\]

To estimate the value of SLB\(_2\), we now need to consider that either KPI\(_1\) and KPI\(_2\) are independent or we must model their correlation. Regarding independence, studies show that even if the KPIs belong to different ESG segments, the correlation is likely to be high. A 2020 study evaluates the average correlation between the E and S factors at 0.79 for S&P500 companies.\(^\text{17}\) In the second case where correlation exists, we need to explicitly model it. In a bivariate case, this is straightforward if one has sufficient data, but more complicated once one considers three or more KPIs that are not easily measured or supported with quality data.

In general, given the issues with availability of data, we would opine that it is hard enough to define the dynamics of one time-series in the ESG context, let alone the interdependence between several, thus making it hard to define such instruments as SUP-SLBs.

Having said that, investors and issuers could consider having one core priceable KPI in their structure that is step-up priceable, then adding others as good measure, but not be expected to derive a premium for them. Alternatively, we view positively an SLB paying several step-ups, each one depending on a different KPI as it removes the need for modelling the correlation between KPIs.

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2. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS

2.1 SUZANO 3.75% 01/15/31

Brazilian paper company Suzano entered the SLB market as early as 2020, raising approximately $2.75 billion through four transactions. Suzano estimates the greenium of its 09/14 SLB issuance at 15 basis points compared to a non-SLB bond.

The Suzano 3.75% SLB’s sustainability condition is linked to emissions intensity relative to the output produced, which is a common KPI in the space. Notably, the KPI upon which the SC is based is averaged over two years rather than being a snapshot. From a technical standpoint, this lowers volatility of the KPI. However, we deem this effect small, and consider the sustainability condition only observed for the year 2025. Our readers will notice that averaging data collected on predetermined observation dates results in a lower volatility hence a reduced option price (an “Asian” option in the world of derivatives trading).

Figure 5. Suzano’s carbon emissions relative to revenue vs tons produced. Source: Bloomberg, Suzano, AFII.

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18 SUZANO 3.75 01/31 (US86964WAJ18, USD1.25bn), SUZANO 3.125 01/32 (US86964WAK80, USD1bn), SUZANO 2.5 09/28 (US86964WAL63, USD500mn). Note that the KPIs for the 3.125 and 2.5 were focused on female representation and industrial water usage rather than the GHG emissions target in the 3.75 bond.

19 “Suzano: Sustainable bonds, rather than loans, is where the greenium is”, Environmental Finance, 2021 (1).
As a reminder, we evaluate the volatility as follows $\sigma = \sigma_i \cdot \beta$ with $\sigma_i$ as the historical volatility of the KPI and $\beta$ as a potential adjustment factor.

Obtaining KPI volatility in this case is not straightforward as we only have six historical data points for the intensity of carbon emissions relative to the tons of pulp and paper produced, as illustrated in Figure 5. Arguably, this is a small sample size to have a strong inference on the volatility parameter even if it is more than exists for most SLBs. As an alternative, we proceed by using the intensity per sales (rather than production) as a proxy as that dataset provides us with eleven data points and seem fairly correlated with the intensity per tons produced. It should be noted that the quality of our approximation depends on the stability of Suzano’s products prices.\(^{20}\) Using the CO2e/t proxy, we estimate the historical volatility such that $\sigma_i = 16.56\%$.

According to the SPO\(^{21}\), Suzano’s transition plan seems to be in line with peers whereas its Bloomberg ESG Disclosure data score is above the sector’s median, such that we see little need to do any $\beta$-adjustment.

Thus, we have:

$$\sigma = 16.56\% \cdot 1 = 16.56\%$$

Using this, we calculate the option value in the SLB based on various drift parameters:

- IPCC 1.5 degrees (-5.80% p.a.): 2.20bps
- IPCC 2 degrees (-2.84% p.a.): 3.71bps
- Historical drift (-1.96% p.a.): 4.23bps

This illustrates the optionality effect quite clearly: depending on the assumed ambition level, the option premium value (that accrues to the issuer) changes between 2.2-4.2bps. If Suzano were to continue decarbonizing as it has done historically, the likelihood is high that the company would not meet its SLB condition, which leads to a high valuation of the coupon step-up option. We illustrate this drift sensitivity in Figure 6 (left). Note that once the drift becomes “high”, the option value converges to the value of the (discounted) coupon step-up payments, almost 12bps.

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\(^{20}\) An important point when measuring carbon intensity as CO2e/sales is whether sales revenue is inflation-adjusted or not. If sales are considered in nominal terms, the intensity will deflate in the same pace as inflation with compounding effects.

\(^{21}\) Suzano Secondary Party Opinion (SPO) – ISS.
Looking at the sensitivity of the model’s parameter, we can observe on Figure 6 (right) that the option price is a bell-shaped function of the volatility which is somewhat intuitive: the bigger the potential movements in carbon intensity the higher the probability to meet the SPT but as the drift is far into negative territory, too small movements (i.e. volatility) around the trend increase the probability to meet the SPT.

Using these inputs and applying Equation (9)-(10), we find that the premium in as measured solely by the inherent value of the coupon step-up for Suzano’s SLB should have been 2.2 basis points. If we take the stated number of total greenium of 15bp at face value, then we would deconstruct this as 12.8bp of non-pecuniary greenium and 2.2bp of optionality value.

Additionally, we looked in Figure 7 at the sensitivity of the optionality value of the SLB with respect to the level of coupon step-ups. Unsurprisingly, we find that the higher the level of the step-up, the higher should be the option value. We estimate that Suzano’s SLB could have delivered a 10 basis points optionality value (thus, 5x the current level) with a coupon step-up of 75 basis points. Although a considerable increase compared to the current 25 basis points step-up, it is still a reasonable level that could be realistically implemented by Suzano.
The key take-aways from this example:

- **Parsimony and data-availability:** Having appropriate and accurate data is crucial for calibrating the option price. If we assume that investors will require an uncertainty premium when lacking data on the dynamics of the KPI, it is actually in the interest of the issuer to provide datasets for investors to calibrate upon. Our experience, to be formally published in later work, is that such data-provisioning is unusual to say the least.

- **Baseline behaviour/drift assumptions:** Differing assumptions on the counterfactual (“if the company were not to issue an SLB, what would its KPI trajectory have been?”) clearly have an important effect when quantifying the option value. Again, if the issuer can present a solid case for its counterfactual, it removes uncertainty premiums. Also, similar to how market participants assumed recovery values as given in CDS pricing, one could imagine standards developing whereby, for example, KPIs are gauged versus IPCC 2-degree target pathways.

- **Level of coupon step-up:** Although the market has largely settled on a 25bps coupon step-up, issuers should be financially rewarded for setting the bar higher than their peers. It can be argued though that in case of missed targets, a too high coupon step-up might become a heavy burden on the issuer’s balance sheet and hamper its financial profile.²²

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²² We explore these considerations in “Notes on risk-neutral pricing of SLBs with application to step-downs”.

Figure 7. Coupon step-up as a function of the option value. Source: AFII, Bloomberg.
2.2 REPSM 0.375% 07/06/29

Oil multinational Repsol launched its first SLB in June 2021, raising EUR1.25bn over an 8yr and a 12yr tranche. Our study focuses on the 8y tranche, which offered investors a 25bps step-up in 2027-29 if the company did not achieve a 12% carbon intensity reduction by 2025.  

For the purpose of its SLB, Repsol designed its own methodology for calculating its carbon intensity (CII – Carbon Intensity Indicator) which “measures the CO2e emissions for every unit of energy that the company makes available to society”. From a pure pricing standpoint, the internal definition poses several issues: (1) the company did not – to our knowledge – make historical data publicly available on the evolution of this KPI, thus making probabilistic inference only possible through proxy; (2) translating science-based goals in terms of SPT expectations (and subsequently defining the drift) might prove highly complex.

As previously discussed in the paper, we would likely define this type as a step-up non-priceable (SUN) SLB where investors are not provided with enough information or structure to price the optionality of the bond, hence removing optionality value and increasing the cost-of-capital accessible for the issuer.

However, we still find it useful to evaluate also this SLB out of a proxy KPI perspective.

Coming back to our statistics estimates, after reviewing of the KPI definition, we find “carbon emissions relative to revenue” to be an acceptable proxy. Repsol’s Carbon Intensity indicator measures the company's CO2 equivalent emissions (numerator) relative to energy obtained through their products (denominator) which is directly linked to the amount of products sold by the company with the drawback that carbon emissions relative to revenue are calculated in nominal terms. Collecting data for the proxy as per Figure 7, we evaluate the historical volatility at 32.2%.

Using the IPCC target 1.5 drift (-5.80%) and a beta parameter of 1, we obtain a valuation of the optionality of 3.3bps. Note that the issuer compared the future values to a 2016 baseline. This may be useful optically – a 12% reduction from 2016 may sound bigger than e.g., a 5% reduction from 2018 – however in terms of the pricing model, only the latest data is relevant in terms of deciding how likely it is that the step-up condition will (not) be met.

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23 In contrast, the 12yr bond, REPSM 0.875 07/2033 (XS2361358299), had a step-up of 37.5bps per annum in 2032-33 if the carbon intensity KPI had not declined by 25% by 2030. “Repsol Carbon Intensity Indicator - definition”, company presentation material, accessed 14 Mar 2022.


25 Source: Bloomberg. Definition: Total greenhouse gas (GHG) if available, else total carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity calculated as metric tonnes of greenhouse gases, if available, else CO2 emitted per million of sales revenue in the company’s reporting currency.
Our first sensitivity analysis with regards to this structure is to look at how sensitive the option value of the SLB would be with respect to more ambitious coupon step-ups. We illustrate this in the left-hand panel of Figure 8. For example, holding the other parameters of the model constant, we can see that in order to get to a 10bp option value premium, the coupon step-up should have been 76bps instead of 25bps (shown as the blue arrow relationship in the graph). This illustrates how the issuer can target a certain all-in-greenium of the SLB by adjusting the size of the coupon. Although it might seem trivial, it may be of some importance when deciding on the structure of an SLB to understand that higher coupon step-ups generate lower cost-of-capital for the issuer in an almost mechanical, linear way.

In the right-hand panel of Figure 8, we look at the impact of the first coupon step-up date on the option value. Intuitively, the option value is increasing as the length of the time-period when the step-up is being paid increases. Ceteris paribus, a structure that starts paying coupon step-ups on dates closer to the issue date is more valuable than one that does so at a later date. Nonetheless, our readers will observe that the relationship is not linear. As time passes, the probability to reach the target increases which in other terms lead to a lower probability the SLB will pay the coupon step-up.
Another application of the model is to calculate the option value as a function of the sustainability performance target (SPT). As observed in Figure 9, the theoretical option value of Repsol’s SLB would have more than doubled had the SPT been set at \(38.85\, \text{g CO}_2\text{e/MJ}\) (red lines) instead of \(68.4\, \text{g CO}_2\text{e/MJ}\) (blue lines), i.e., a 50% carbon intensity reduction compared to the 2016 baseline.

From an optionality standpoint, a more ambitious SPT entails an option that is even more “in-the-money” and subsequently priced higher. Indeed, in the 2021 Sustainability Report, Repsol announced an absolute Scope 1 + Scope 2 emission reduction target of 55% to 2030,\(^{26}\) which – if adhered to and applied in an SLB framework – would have allowed the issuer to reap that 10bps option premium. Add to this a reduction of uncertainty premium, as from a statistical angle such a target would have been much easier to generate data for as well as to measure going forward.

Key takeaways from our Repsol example are as follows:

- **Structural parameters**: We show how the interaction between the option premium and the structural parameters (coupon step-up size, timing of CSU) can be tuned to achieve, for example, a particular coupon size. It is clear that these decisions are material to the size of the option premium and hence the all-in-greenium the issuer can access.

- **KPI construction and condition ambition**: the Repsol SLB has what appears to be an over-engineered KPI making probabilistic inference hard in our view. Using an alternative, however, we show how ambition-level again can drive quite different magnitudes of the option value and all-in-greenium.
3. END NOTES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The size of coupon step-ups, the timing of when they happen and the probability that it will happen are three factors that are crucial to determine in order to price the optionality value in an SLB.

For market participants, we believe that being able to have a decent amount of inference on the last factor, probabilities, is important in order to reduce risk-premiums on this novel type of bond. Thus, it would seem to be in the interest of issuers of SLBs to provide more robust and transparent data and metrics in these structures than what is the case currently in the market. We believe, from an investor perspective, that segmenting SLBs coming to market as step-up priceable (SUP) or step-up non-priceable (SUN) is useful to direct efforts in analysis and investment activity.

Moreover, we believe the proposed pricing approach should provide issuers with a stronger argument as to why SLB targets should be ambitious as it does link ambition levels to a lowering cost of capital. The analogy with convertible bonds is not far-fetched: convertibles have lower coupons than traditional bonds due to the equity conversion optionality. If investors deem that optionality valuable, they will accept significantly lower coupons on the bond component. In the context of transition companies, which often is touted as the key domain for issuing SLBs, “selling” optionality around transition plans, will drive significantly lower cost-of-capital only if the targets are indeed ambitious.

In the empirical examples that we have shown in this paper, some of the SLB option premiums might have seen modest, as bonds still have been relatively short, but it is worth reminding that the maximum size of the premium grows in line with the full discounted cash flows of the step-up. Longer bonds will start showing magnitudes that are substantially bigger. Building structures such as 5x15s, i.e., a five-year condition and fifteen-year maturity, will be an interesting application that also should align well with the long-term commitments of energy transition projects.

3.1 INTEGRATION OF DEFAULT RISK

In this first version of the pricing approach, we do not model default probabilities. The probability that the bond will be repaid (and that coupons will be paid) is correlated to the level of spread at which the bond is trading. Given that the coupon step-up increases spreads, one should expect that the value of the option will decrease, as it is less likely that the step-up coupon stream will be paid in full compared to the non-step-up. The differential will be increasing in step-up size. Add to this any correlation between the failing to miss a sustainability target and underlying default probabilities as well; studies show that a company which poorly manages its sustainability risks is more likely to underperform overall.\textsuperscript{27} We intend to model default probabilities in a future extension to the current approach.

\textsuperscript{27} “Are Sustainable Companies More Likely to Default? Evidence from the Dynamics between Credit and ESG Ratings?”, A. Aslan, L. Poppe and P. Posch, MDPI (2021).
3.2 EFFECTS ON DURATION/YTM

Investors looking to buy SLBs should be wary of the effects the optionality of the coupon step-up could have on the bond’s duration and convexity, and the substantial impact on their portfolio’s total risk assessment. Our approach of inferring probability metrics for the sustainability conditions being achieved should be helpful in such calculations.

3.3 PARAMETERS CALIBRATION

Pricing SLBs requires both observable and latent variables as an input. Observable variables such as coupon or maturity are directly observed whereas latent variables (namely drift, beta and volatility) require mathematical models and/or investors’ judgement to be estimated. The use of latent variables is not new to the financial sphere and is inherent to option pricing. The disclosure of ESG data being relatively recent in the financial markets’ history, it is not surprising to see many issuers coming in the market with SLBs that belong to the “SUN” segment of the SLB market. As time passes and regulators and investors push for increased data quality and disclosure, we should see the proportion of “SUN” SLB decreasing to the benefit of “SUP” SLBs.

We introduced in this paper a simple methodology for evaluating the KPI’s volatility based on both historical data and investors’ own appreciation of the issuer’s sustainability profile (the “beta”). However, there might not be enough of the KPI’s historical data to perform meaningful statistics calculations. Small sample techniques (econometric approaches, structural mathematical modelling) in this context could be a promising direction for future research. The beta parameter on the other hand cannot be observed. An idea for objectifying its calibration is to create a decision tree based, for example, on the quality of data disclosed and the belief in the issuer’s transition plan.

3.4 ADVANCED COUPON STEP-UP STRUCTURES

As has been briefly touched upon, most SLBs in the market currently have several KPIs, and further research is needed in terms of understanding how to price the optionality in such cases. As argued, a high correlation between KPIs will reduce the additional option value by each KPI compared to when it has been applied individually. This effect is often used in pricing structured products such as auto-call baskets, and not in a way that we deem in benefit to the end investor.

Furthermore, we have only considered a one-time knock-in type of SLB structure. There could be many variations to this, which could have meaningful impacts in terms of driving sustainability impacts: for example, having multiple, additional step-ups if conditions are not met, or having step-downs if they are. Having good inference on the law-of-motion for the KPIs becomes more and more important as the coupon structure becomes more complex.
DECOMPOSING RISK PREMIUMS IN LABELLED BONDS

We illustrate this in Figure 10 where we also add a new issue premium component. In the example, we assume that a secondary market bond would trade at point A (“fair value”) at a spread of 54bp. However, a new issue bond would have to offer a new issue premium (NIP) of 11bp, landing it at 65bp (point B). Hypothetically, a new issue green bond would be issued at 60bp (point D), meaning that the real greenium in a green bond would be (B-A)-(D-A) = (65-54) - (60-54) = 5bp when accounting for the inherent new issue premium.\(^{28}\)

Now, if we assume that the optionality component in a coupon-step up bond would be worth 5bp for the investor, we get a standard bond pricing with step-up optionality at 49bp (C), excluding NIP. If we define an SLB as a green bond with a coupon step-up, that SLB would then price with both the greenium (13bp) and the option premium (5bp) at 47bp (E) in fair value terms. However, given that is a new issue, we need to add the NIP:

\[
\text{SLB NI spread} = \text{Bond fair value} + \text{new issue premium} - \text{optionality value} - \text{greenium} = F = A + (B-A) - (A-C) - (B-D) \Leftrightarrow F = B-A-C-D
\]

\[
D = B-A-C-F \text{ which is the expression to get the greenium in the SLB, accounting for NIP and optionality in it.}
\]

We note that the NIP (B-A) can be inferred from cross-sectional analysis of the market.\(^{29}\)

Figure 11. Deconstructing a ‘greenium’ in an SLB.
APPENDIX 2

CARBON EMISSIONS VOLATILITY REGIMES

An idea to validate the introduction of the beta parameter is to look at carbon emissions’ volatility regimes for issuers who have managed to reduce their emissions over time. Limited availability of historical data in the corporate world makes it difficult to assess but looking at country level data, we are provided with robust datasets well suited for the purpose of our analysis.

We observe that emissions volatility grew strikingly for countries that have embarked on their transition journey after decades of upward emissions trajectory when emissions started decreasing. Finland and Spain saw the volatility of their emissions grow respectively by 63% and 69% when their emissions started decreasing (see Figure 12).

Figure 12. Spain (LHS) and Finland (RHS) carbon emissions and volatility regimes. Sources: Bloomberg, AFII.

![Graphs of carbon emissions and volatility for Spain and Finland](https://example.com/graphs.png)

Although it is difficult to infer a defined value for the β parameter solely based on the above observations, investors having a strong positive view of the issuer’s sustainability profile should set β>1. Our readers familiar with derivatives pricing will recognize here the concept of implied volatility.
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